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SECTION 523(aX6): WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS
EXCEPTION FROM DISCHARGE: THE "IMPLIED
MALICE" STANDARD
I.

INTRODUCTION

A major provision of modern bankruptcy law is discharge of debt.
The purpose of this provision for discharge is generally recognized as
giving a fresh start "to the honest but unfortunate debtor." 1 The key
word in this phrase is "honest." Throughout the history of United
States bankruptcy law, Congress intended that discharge only be available to the honest debtor.' As a result, Congress created several exceptions to the discharge provision. 3 Among the debts excepted from the
discharge provision are those incurred as the result of a "willful and
malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of
another entity."" A number of courts have addressed the issue of what
acts by the debtor and what types of debt fall within the meaning of
the phrase "willful and malicious".5
Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,0 the
courts have taken a variety of approaches in construing the willful and
malicious exception. This disparity of approaches has undermined the
goals of the bankruptcy system, among which are uniformity in the

1. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). The Court stated that "[o]ne of the
primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to 'relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities
consequent upon business misfortunes.'" Id. (quoting Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)).
2. Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 1047, 1050
(1987).
3. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(l)-(10) (1988). Discharge is not available for certain taxes or customs duties, debt incurred by false oral or written representation, debt which was not listed or
scheduled in a manner to permit the creditor to file a proof of claim, debt resulting from fraud or
defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement or larceny, debts for alimony or
child support under a separation agreement, divorce decree or court order, debt due to willful and
malicious injury, debt which is for a fine, penalty or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a
governmental unit, debt for educational loans made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit
or funded in whole or part by a governmental unit or a nonprofit institution when the loan first
became due within five years of the date of the filing of the petition, debt which arose as a result
of the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated and debt that was not discharged in a prior bankruptcy case.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1988).
5. See e.g., Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904); In re Long, 774 F.2d 875 (8th Cir.
1985); United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson, 35 Bankr. 766 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Hodges,
4 Bankr. 513 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980); Doty v. Rogers, 213 S.C. 361 (1948).
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1501 (1988).
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treatment of creditors and debtors,7 provision of a "fresh start" to the
honest debtor, 8 protection of the interests of creditors,' and achievement of economic efficiency in allocating the risk of loss between the
parties. 10
This comment discusses the separate approaches which courts
have taken when interpreting the willful and malicious exception to discharge. First, this comment examines those cases which interpret the
willful and malicious exception to discharge to require an "intent to
harm." This approach is analyzed to determine if it effectuates the
goals of bankruptcy and complies with congressional intent. Next, those
cases applying a "heightened culpability" standard to the willful and
malicious exception are considered. This approach is also evaluated in
terms of the goals of bankruptcy and congressional intent. Finally, the
"implied malice" approach to the willful and malicious exception to
discharge is examined. This comment concludes that the "implied malice" approach best effectuates the goals of bankruptcy and complies
with congressional intent.
II.

BACKGROUND

Early bankruptcy laws made no provision for a discharge of debt.
These laws were based on the proposition that bankrupt debtors were
wrongdoers." The early English bankruptcy acts dealt with debtors as
quasi-criminals.1 3 Bankruptcy laws were thus viewed as quasi-punitive
in nature," often resulting in the debtor being sent to debtors' prison or
having all of his property seized by creditors.15 Discharge was first introduced in early English law as a means of inducing debtors to make a
full disclosure and delivery of their assets.16 These early discharge pro-

7. Note, Exceptions to Discharge: Section 523, 3 BANKR. DEV. J. 295, 295 (1986).
8. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
9. Howard, supra note 2, at 1048.
10. Id.
11.
H. REMINGTON, I A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 2
(5th ed. 1950); Ayer, How to Think About Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 355, 367
(1986).
12. H. REMINGTON, supra note 11, § 2, at 6.
13. See id. ("In the first of the English acts the bankrupt was always referred to as 'the
offender,' an odium of crime being thus cast upon the word 'bankrupt' which has clung to it this
day.").
14. Ayer, supra note 11, at 367.
15. Comment, Protection of Debtor's "Fresh Start" Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 29
CATH. U.L REV. 843, 846 (1980).
16. J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 88 (1956); see also H. REMINGTON, supra note II, § 5.
"[A]nd be it further enacted that all and every person and persons so becoming bankrupt
as aforesaid, who shall, within the time limited by this act, surrender him, her or themselves-and all things conform as in and by this act is directed-shall be discharged from
all debts by him, her or them due and owing at the time that he, she or they did become
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visions gave creditors the power to grant a discharge. 17 Qualifications
to the discharge, such as requiring that the assets of the debtor equal a
certain portion of his debts, and that a certain portion of the debtor's
creditors assent to his discharge, were later included. 18 The first bankruptcy act in the United States, passed in 1800, provided for the right
of discharge, subject to the unfettered discretion of the creditor. 9
As the law of bankruptcy evolved, discharge became more readily
available to the debtor. The second bankruptcy act, passed in 1841,
contained a subtle, yet important, distinction from the previous laws
allowing discharge at the discretion of the creditor.2 The Act of 1841.
required that, unless the creditor objected, the debtor be provided a
discharge if the debtor complied with all aspects of the Act of 1841
and made a full delivery of assets.21 Creditors could still vote against
the discharge, but it was their responsibility to make the first objection.22 This changing attitude toward discharge was fully reflected in
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.23 As in previous acts, the Act of 1898
required the debtor to apply for the discharge.2" The right to discharge
was, however, considered absolute unless an appropriate party objected
and the court made certain findings."
These legislative changes reflect the evolving purpose behind discharge.2 6 Although the original policy of promoting debtor cooperation
was still present, providing a "fresh start" to the debtor became the
prominent consideration. This fresh start policy reflected the belief
that the discharge benefitted not only the debtor by allowing him to
escape burdensome debt, but also society in general by encouraging the
debtor to again become a productive member of the community. 28 Such

bankrupt."

H.

supra note 1i, § 5 (quoting 4 Anne, ch. 17 (1705)).
17. Ayer, supra note 11, at 367.

REMINGTON,

18. H. REMINGTON, supra note 11, § 5.
19. Ayer, supra note 11, at 367; see Bankruptcy Act of 1800, § 36, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed
1803). The creditor was given discretion to grant a discharge and could do so for any reason or for
no reason. A certificate of discharge was required to be signed by %of the creditors whose interest
was greater than $50. Id.
20. Ayer, supra note 11, at 367.
21. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 4, 5 Stat. 440, 443 (repealed 1843).
22. Id. § 4, 5 stat. at 443; see Ayer, supra note 11, at 367.
23. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 14-17, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
24. Id. § 15, 30 Stat. at 550.
25. A debtor was given the right of discharge unless he committed an offense punishable by
imprisonment or destroyed financial records with the intent to conceal his financial condition or
failed to keep records from which his financial condition could be ascertained. Id. § 15, 30 Stat. at
550. In addition, specific debts were also exempted from discharge. Id. § 17, 30 Stat. at 550.
26. J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 16, at 88.
27. Id.
28. Id.; see also H. REMINGTON, supra note 11, § 17. ("Looking at the over-all picture,
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a policy also reflected the changing status of a debtor in society.
Moreover, the fresh start policy reflected the belief that many debtors
were unsophisticated in dealings with credit and were subject to being
taken advantage of by a sophisticated creditor.3 0 As noted above, it was
generally believed that a fresh start policy could be served if discharge
was provided only to the "honest" debtor. 1 Consequently, several exceptions to the discharge were created in order to insure that those
incurring debt as the result of some culpable behavior not be given the
benefit of discharge.32 Among the exceptions set out in the Act of 1898
was the exception for debts resulting from willful and malicious injuries.33 The Act of 1898 stated "[a] discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts, . . . except . . . for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another."'" The
courts have struggled to define this exception.

A.

Tinker v. Colwell: Original Definition of "Willful and Malicious"

Initially, the United States Supreme Court settled the question of
what constituted a willful and malicious injury in Tinker v. Colwell.3
In Tinker, the Court set out a basic standard for the terms willful and
malicious. 6 The case involved the dischargeability of a debt resulting
from a judgment in a criminal conversation proceeding. 7 The defendant, Tinker, sought to discharge a $50,000 judgment he suffered in
state court stemming from an adulterous affair he had carried on with
Colwell's wife.3 8 After the proceedings, Tinker filed for bankruptcy and
Colwell opposed discharge of the judgment, claiming the debt was incurred as the result of a willful and malicious injury to his property.3
The Supreme Court found that a husband had certain exclusive rights

however, bankruptcy is not solely for the relief' of debtors, but a social measure. Its aim is not
merely release from the pressure of debt, but social and economic rehabilitation as well.").
29. Ayer, supra note 11, at 369. One reason for the growing acceptance of discharge in
bankruptcy was "the conviction that debtors in a complicated world probably don't have much
control over whether and to what extent they are able to meet their obligations." Id.
30. J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 16, at 88.
31. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
32. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 17(a)(1)-(4), 30 Stat 544, 550-51 (repealed 1978).
33. Id. § 17(a)(2), 30 Stat. at 550. Other exceptions included tax debts, debts created by
fraud, embezzlement or misappropriation while acting in a fiduciary capacity and debts resulting
from judgments for fraud or the obtaining of property by false pretenses or false representations.
Id. § 17(a)(1)-(4), 30 Stat. at 550.
34. Id. § 17(a)(2), 30 Stat. at 550.
35. 193 U.S. 473 (1904).
36. Id.
37. Id. Criminal conversation was a cause of action for the act of adultery. The two terms
are essentially interchangeable.
38. Id. at 474.
39. Id.
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(both personal and property) with respect to his wife and that because
a wife was incapable, under the law, of giving any consent to affect
those rights, criminal conversation or adultery by another man could be
described as an injury to the personal property of the husband.40 The
Court held that the debt did fall within the meaning of a "willful and
malicious" injury and denied discharge."1 In so doing, the Court set
forth the standard for determining whether an act falls within the willful and malicious exception to discharge. The Court enunciated the
standard as follows:
a willful disregard of what one knows to be his duty, an act which- is
against good morals and wrongful in and of itself, and which necessarily
causes injury and is done intentionally, may be said to be done willfully
and maliciously, so as to come within the exception [to discharge in
bankruptcy] ."

To fall within the exception, the debtor's act must not only be willful but also malicious. The Court noted that a finding of "special malice," defined as some malevolent purpose or ill will toward another, is
not required.' 3 Rather, malice could be implied from the action, where
one who performs a wrongful act knows of the harmful consequences or
the surrounding circumstances indicate that such knowledge can be inferred. 44 The Tinker Court pointed out that the willful and malicious
exception did not require that every willful act be malicious. The Court
stated that:
One who negligently drives through a crowded thoroughfare and negligently runs over an individual would not, as we suppose, be within the
exception. True he drives negligently, and that is a wrongful act, but he
does not intentionally drive over the individual. 5If he intentionally did
drive over him, it would certainly be malicious.4
Thus, the court found that a wrongful, intentional act which necessarily
causes harm comes within the meaning of willful and malicious, but
40.

Id. at 481.

41.

Id.

42. Id. at 487. In coming up with its definition, the Court quoted from several lower courts
who had also considered the issue. Id. at 486. One lower court held that:
"'Malice,' in law, simply means a depraved inclination on the part of a person to disregard
the rights of others, which intent is manifested by his injurious acts. While it may be true
that in his unlawful act [the wrongdoer] was not actuated by hatred or revenge or passion
towards the plaintiff, nevertheless, if he acted wantonly against what any man of reasonable intelligence must have known to be contrary to his duty, and purposely prejudicial and
injurious to another, the law will imply malice."
Id. at 486-87 (quoting In re Freche, 109 F. 620, 621 (1901)).
43. Id. at 490.
44.

Id.

45. Id. at 489.
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that not every willful act is malicious. While the Court made no apparent determination as to whether reckless acts come within the willful
and malicious exception to discharge, it is necessarily implied.
A majority of lower courts following Tinker have found that the
standard set out by the Court included not only intentional and deliberate acts, but also acts rising only to the level of recklessness. These
courts thus applied a standard of recklessness to both the willfulness
and the maliciousness of the act."
Other courts construing Tinker found that while, a reckless standard could be applied in finding malice or implied malice, a reckless
standard could not be used to establish a willful act. Instead, these
courts held that the act itself had to be intentional and deliberate in
order to be willful, and that a showing of defendant's reckless disregard
was not sufficient.4 Both lines of interpretation were followed until the
passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978."
The Supreme Court reexamined the issue of the willful and malicious exception in Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co."" The debtor in Davis
was a car dealer who had his vehicle floorplan financed by Aetna Acceptance Company (Aetna)." Although Aetna held a security interest
in the vehicles, the dealer sold one of the cars without remitting the
proceeds to Aetna.5 1 The parties stipulated that the sale was made in
52
the ordinary course of business and that nothing was concealed. Notice of the sale was given to Aetna even though no express consent was
obtained.5 3 There was also evidence that a number of other cars were
sold under similar circumstances. 4 The debtor promised to remit payment immediately but failed to keep that promise and subsequently

46. In re Kubiniec, 2 F. Supp. 632 (W.D.N.Y. 1932) (a willful injury is one which has been
done under such circumstances as to indicate reckless disregard for the safety of others); Fitzgerald v. Herzer, 78 Cal. App. 2d 127, 177 P.2d 364 (1947) (acts of defendant which were judged to
be grossly careless, reckless and negligent and wanton found to come within exception of willful
and malicious); Matthews v. Franklin, 74 So. 2d 309 (La. Ct. App. 1954) (wanton and reckless
operation of a vehicle may come within the meaning of willful and malicious); Doty v. Rogers,
213 S.C. 361 (1948) (a wrongful act done in utter disregard of the rights of others evidencing a
reckless disregard for the safety of others constitutes a willful and malicious injury within the
act).
47. In re Rainey, 1 Bankr. 569 (Bankr. D. Or. 1979); Greenfield v. Tuccillo, 129 F.2d 854
(2d Cir. 1942); In re Vena 46 F.2d 81, 82 (W.D. Wash. 1930).
48. See cases cited supra notes 47-48; see also Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1501 (1988).
49. 293 U.S. 328 (1934).
50. Id. at 330.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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filed for bankruptcy.5 The Court found that the debtor had committed
no malicious act.56 The Court held that, in order to determine whether
an act of conversion is willful and malicious, reference must be made to
the surrounding circumstances."7 The Court determined that "[t]here
may be a conversion which is innocent or technical, an unauthorized
assumption of dominion without wilfulness or malice." 8 The Court further held that "[tihere may be an honest, but mistaken belief, engendered by a course of dealing, that powers have been enlarged or incapacities removed. In these and like cases, what is done is a tort, but not
a wilful and malicious one." 5 9 The Court found that Davis' conversion
of the sale proceeds was not malicious under the exception, stating that
the "discharge will prevail as against a showing of conversion without
aggravated features."60 A defendant who thus innocently or mistakenly
harms the plaintiffs interests, as determined from the surrounding
facts and circumstances, cannot be found to have acted maliciously.
B.

The Bankruptcy Reform Act & New Interpretations

With the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Congress retained a number of exceptions to discharge. Specifically, Congress chose to adopt substantially the same language as in the Act of
1878 in providing for an exception for debts incurred as the result of
willful and malicious injury.' Although the language was basically the
same, the new section was accompanied by legislative history purporting to clarify this exception.62 This legislative history has been the
source of much debate in the courts. The legislative history accompanying the exception to discharge states:
Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the
debtor to another person. Under this paragraph, "willful" means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473
(1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that
other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a "reckless disregard" standard, they are overruled.68
55. Id.
56. Id. at 332-33.
57. Id. at 332.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 333.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1988). This section excepts from discharge debts incurred as the
result of "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another
entity." Id.
62. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 365 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6320-21; see also S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1978 U.S CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5865.
63. H.R. REP.No., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 365 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
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Instead of clarifying the willful and malicious exception, the legislative
history only created more ambiguity regarding the meaning of
malicious.
The courts which have interpreted this new section and its legislative history have not disputed the meaning of the word willful. Willful
is now generally accepted to mean a voluntary, deliberate or intentional
act.64 An injury which occurs as the result of reckless action is no
5
longer considered sufficient grounds for denying discharge. The injury
instead must be the result of a deliberate, intentional act on the part of
the debtor.6
Although courts are now generally in agreement as to the definition of the willful prong of the exception, there is a split in the courts
as to what type of conduct can be viewed as malicious. There are three
separate approaches. First, a majority of courts interpret the legislative
history to overrule Tinker only to the extent that the decision applied a
e7
reckless standard to the willful prong. These courts continue to use
the Tinker standard of "implied malice" when determining exceptions
to discharge.68 Second, other courts interpret the legislative history to
completely overrule Tinker.a9 These courts require a finding of a specourt,7 0
cific "intent to harm," special malice as defined by the Tinker

ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6320-21.
64. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 779 F.2d 1003 (4th Cir. 1985); In re
Compos, 768 F.2d 1155, 1157 (10th Cir. 1985); In re Horldt, 86 Bankr. 823, 825 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1988).
65. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY $ 523.16, at 523-118 (15th ed. 1989).
66. See In re Long, 774 F.2d 875, 880 (8th Cir. 1985) (there exists a "virtual consensus"
that willful means intentional or deliberate); Compos, 768 F.2d at 1157 (the express intent of
Congress was that willful mean intentional and deliberate); In re Quezada, 718 F.2d 121, 121
(5th Cir. 1983) (defendant's negligence in allowing pit bulldog to escape does not come within
exception which requires intentional, deliberate injury); Horldt, 86 Bankr. at 825 (controversy
among courts does not include "willful" prong as courts agree that debtor's conduct must be found
to be intentional to be willful); see also 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 66, 1 523.16, at
523-118 ("word 'willful' means 'deliberate or intentional,' a deliberate or intentional act which
necessarily leads to injury").
67. E.g., 'United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson, 35 Bankr. 766, 774 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1983).
68. See In re Cecchini, 780 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986) (an intentional, wrongful act is
sufficient to establish malice on the part of the defendant); In re Meyer, 100 Bankr. 301 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 1989) (malice may be implied by showing that debtor intentionally committed an inherently wrongful act without just cause or excuse); In re Cobley, 89 Bankr. 446, 451 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1988) (malice implied from act of beating prison inmate, such act being intentional and without just cause or excuse); In re Dubian, 77 Bankr. 332, 337 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (malice
implied from intentional wrongful act of intentional interference with contractual relations); Nelson, 35 Bankr. at 776 (intentional act of converting insurance proceeds, without just cause or
excuse, comes within definition of malicious); In re Ries, 22 Bankr. 343, 347 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1982) (intentional act of selling piano in which debtor knew bank held security interest was within
the definition of malicious).
69. E.g., In re Hodges, 4 Bankr. 513 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980).
70. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 487-88 (1904).
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before excepting a debt from the discharge." Third, some courts basically ignore the legislative history and opt for a standard falling somewhere between the implied malice standard and the intent to harm

standard. 7 a This approach, found mainly in recent decisions, attempts
to create the most equitable solution based on the facts of the
73
situation.
C.

Implied Malice Standard

The majority of courts still apply the implied malice standard set
out in Tinker. These courts find that, while willful requires an intentional, deliberate act, the maliciousness of the act can be implied from
the action itself; thus, there is no requirement of special malice or an
intent to harm.7 ' The rationale for this approach is explained in United
Bank of Southgate v. Nelson.7 The defendant in this case purchased a

mobile home in which the bank held a security interest.7 The mobile
home was completely destroyed in an accident and the defendant was
given a check by the insurance company to cover the loss. 77 The de-

fendant, in knowing violation of the security agreement, failed to remit
the insurance proceeds to the bank.7 The bankruptcy court found that,
because the defendant had no specific intent to harm the bank, the debt

was dischargeable.7 9 The district court reversed this holding finding
that Tinker stood for two separate principles."0 First, willfulness could
be established by a reckless standard. Second, malice could be implied

71. See In re Hartley, 869 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1989) (intentional act of throwing lighted
firecracker into basement filled with gasoline fumes not within exception to discharge for willful
and malicious injuries since actor did not intend to cause explosion and fire which injured plaintiff); In re.Compos, 768 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir. 1985) (act of intentionally driving while intoxicated
does not preclude discharge where defendant did not intend to injure plaintiff); In re Akridge, 89
Bankr. 66 (Bankr. App. P. 9th Cir. 1988) (act of crossing picket line in violation of union constitution not malicious where debtor's act was motivated by economic need rather than intent to
cause harm); In re Hodges, 4 Bankr. 513 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980) (act of selling stereo in knowing violation of security agreement not within meaning of exception to discharge where defendant
did not intend to harm plaintiff).
72. E.g., Coffy v. Burdick, 65 Bankr. 105 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986).
73. See In re Long, 774 F.2d 875, 880 (8th Cir. 1985) (some amount of "heightened culpability" required in order for debt to come within exception); In re Horldt, 86 Bankr. 823, 825
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (act of intentionally selling secured collateral did not preclude discharge
where evidence indicated that defendant acted to benefit creditors); Burdick, 65 Bankr. at 105
(court examined "totality of circumstances" in establishing malice).
74. See, e.g., United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson, 35 Bankr. 766 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1983).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 767.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79: Id. at 768.
80. Id. at 769.
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from the surrounding circumstances. 1 The court examined the legislative history concerning this section and determined that, because Congress spoke only to the willful prong of the exception, it meant to overrule Tinker's application of a reckless standard to the element of
willfulness.82 The court found that Congress did not intend to overrule
Tinker's application of implied malice.8 The court therefore held that
a debtor who knows that her action will harm the creditor but nonetheless proceeds in the face of this knowledge can be said to have performed a malicious act. 84
A majority of courts have followed this interpretation of the legislative history.88 These courts have used the general standard that "[a]
wrongful act done intentionally, which necessarily produces harm and
is without just cause or excuse, may constitute a willful and malicious
injury." 86 The key phrase in this standard is "an act which necessarily
produces harm."'87 This phrase indicates that the harm must be of the
type which logically flows from the act, such that one who intentionally
or deliberately performs the act either knows or should have known of
88
the harm which will occur due to the very nature of the act. If a
wrongful, intentional act is committed, courts applying this approach
will not hesitate to imply malice from the debtor's actions and the surrounding circumstances.8 9
D.

"Intent to Harm" Standard

Although the majority of courts adhere to the Tinker standard of
implied malice, a number of courts have required a much stricter standard to find a debt nondischargeable. These courts have interpreted the
81. Id.
82. Id. at 774.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 776.
85. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rebhan, 842 F.2d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 1988); Perkins v.
Scharffe, 817 F.2d 392, 394 (6th Cir. 1987); Wheeler v. Laudani, 783 F.2d 610, 615 (6th Cir.
1986); In re Cecchini, 780 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Vaughn, 779 F.2d 1003, 1009 (4th Cir. 1985); In re Quezada, 718 F.2d 121, 123 (5th Cir. 1983);
In re Dardar, 620 F.2d 39, 40 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Clark, 116 Bankr. 552, 554 (N.D. Ohio
1990); In re Cobley, 89 Bankr. 446, 451 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Erickson, 89 Bankr. 850,
852 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1988); In re Jones, 88 Bankr. 899, 902 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988); In re
1987); In re Taylor, 58 Bankr. 849, 855 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
Condict, 71 Bankr. 485, 487 (N.D. Ill.
1986); In re Ries, 22 Bankr. 343, 347 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982).

86.

3 COLLIER

ON BANKRUPTCY,

supra note 66, 1 523.16, at 523-117.

87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Id.; see Nelson, 35 Bankr. at 776 (malice may be inferred from the nature and conduct
of the act itself).
89. It is apparent that the debtor's knowledge of the probable consequences can be inferred
from his actions and/or his experience in business. In re Ries, 22 Bankr. 343 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1982).
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legislative history to require an intent to harm on the part of the
debtor.90
An early case establishing this line of interpretation was In re
Hodges. 1 In Hodges, the debtor sold a stereo in which the plaintiff
held a security interest. 92 Although the debtor stated that he did not
know the plaintiff held a security interest, the debtor was aware that
the plaintiff held some rights to the stereo. 3 The bankruptcy court, in
examining the legislative history, found that Congress intended to completely overrule the Tinker standard for both the willful and malicious
prongs." The court stated that the "reckless" or "utter disregard"
standard had been overruled, apparently construing the two prongs of
willful and malicious together, and held that "[w]ithout the Tinker
standard, that leaves but one choice 'intent to do harm.' "" The court
found that although Hodges was aware that the plaintiff had rights in
the stereo and that Hodges sold the stereo willfully, Hodges did not sell
it maliciously, because he sold it to acquire money for a house payment
and food.96 He did not, therefore, sell the stereo with the intent to harm
the plaintiff.97 These courts require that some ill will or intent to harm
be proven before a debt will be excepted from the discharge. 98
Some cases from the Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals
have also required an intent to harm, 9' but their presentation of the
standard varies slightly from the foregoing courts. These courts have
examined the language of the exception itself and held that the word
willful modifies the word injury. 100 These courts have determined that
Congress intended to except only those debts resulting from intentional
90. See In re Hartley, 869 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1989); Cassidy v. Minihan, 794 F.2d 340 (8th
Cir. 1986); In re Compos, 768 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir. 1985); In re Lane, 76 Bankr. 1016 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Kinney, 54 Bankr 36 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); In re Lewis, 17 Bankr. 46
(Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1981); In re Nelson, 10 Bankr. 691 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1981); In re Hodges, 4
Bankr. 513 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980).
91. 4 Bankr. 513 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980).
92. Id. at 514.
93.

Id.

94. Id. at 516.
95.

Id.

96. Id. at 517.
97. Id. The court also relied on Davis, 293 U.S. at 328, to find the debt dischargeable. The
reliance on Davis is misplaced. Davis concerned an innocent and unintentional conversion of the
sale proceeds of an automobile. Id. at 332. In Hodges, however, the debtor was aware of the
creditor's rights and deliberately sold the collateral in the face of those rights. Hodges, 4 Bankr.
at 514.
98. Hodges. 4 Bankr. at 516.
99. See In re Hartley, 869 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1989); Cassidy v. Minihan, 794 F.2d 340 (8th
Cir. 1986); In re Compos, 768 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir. 1985).
100.

E.g., Hartley, 869 F.2d at 395.
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or deliberate injuries. 101 Thus, these courts effectively read the malicious requirement out of the statute. Regardless of the way the standard is articulated, both approaches basically center on the subjective
intent to harm the creditor.
E. Heightened Culpability
The third approach has attempted to apply a middle ground to the
"willful and malicious" standard. This standard falls somewhere between the "implied malice" standard of Tinker and the "intent to injure" standard as spelled out in Hodges. Courts applying the heightened culpability standard have attempted to require a little more
culpability on the part of the debtor before finding a debt nondischargeable.10 2 Although this approach does not require a specific intent
to harm, it does mandate something more than a showing that the
03 These courts, like those
debtor acted without just cause or excuse.
following the intent, to harm standard, take a subjective approach as to
what the debtor knew when the debt was incurred.'" For example, in
In re Long,'0 5 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that "if malice, as it is used in section 523(a)(6), is to have any meaning independent of willful it must apply only to conduct more culpable than that
which is in reckless disregard of creditors' economic interests and expectancies, as distinguished from mere legal rights."'" The court
added that "knowledge that legal rights are being violated is insufficient to establish malice, absent some additional 'aggravated circumstances.' ,107 The Long court, therefore, seemed to require a greater
burden than was demanded under the Tinker standard of implied malice.108 The court found that the issue of nondischargeability turned on
the establishment of two elements: first, whether the conduct was
"headstrong and knowing"; and second, whether the conduct was
"targeted at the creditor . . . in the sense that the conduct is certain or
09
almost certain to cause financial harm."' The court found the defendant's conduct willful because he knew the diversion of funds to a corpo-

101. Id.; Cassidy, 794 F.2d 344; Compos, 768 F.2d at 1158-59.
102. See In re Long, 774 F.2d 875 (8th Cir. 1985); In re Horldt, 86 Bankr. 823 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Burdick, 65 Bankr. 105 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986).
103. Long, 774 F.2d at 875.
104. In re Mclaughlin, 109 Bankr. 14 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989) (court looked to whether
debtor acted in "good faith" and whether debtor had "realistic hopes" that his actions would
result in benefit to the creditor).
105. 774 F.2d 875 (8th Cir. 1985).
106. Id. at 881.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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rate account rather than a collateral account was in derogation of a
contractual agreement with the plaintiff. 10 The defendant testified,
however, that he was only using the diverted money for the purpose of
benefitting the plaintiff and other creditors and not for his own personal
gain." The court held that the defendant could not be found to have
known that his action would harm the plaintiff even though the defendant was aware of the inherent wrongfulness of the act." 2 The court
found that this did not rise to the level of culpability required to except
8
the debt from discharge."
A similar approach was taken by the bankruptcy court of the
Northern District of Indiana in the case of In re Burdick." 4 In this
case, the defendant purchased thirty-nine milk cows." 5 The plaintiff
held a security interest in the cows, with a right to repossess." e When a
number of the cows failed to produce adequate amounts of milk, the
defendant sold a portion of the herd, receiving approximately $9000."1
The court, in examining the debtor's actions, refused to apply either
the intent to harm or implied malice standards." s The court found that
these two approaches were inherently unfair and instead chose "to
make the determination of malice by looking at the totality of the
circumstances."" 9
The Burdick court made a distinction between a commercial setting and a noncommercial setting. 2 0 In a commercial setting, the court
found it relevant to consider such documents as security agreements,
leases and/or licenses.' This type of evidence would help determine
whether the defendant had been given adequate notice of the permitted
uses of the collateral. 22 The court also found that the commercial so-

110. Id.
111. Id.at 882
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 65 Bankr. 105 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986).
115. Id.at 106.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 106-07.
118. Id.at 110. The court found that a specific intent to harm standard puts a nearly insurmountable burden on the creditor. Id.at 109. The court also found that requiring only a showing
of implied malice gives the creditor the opportunity to produce evidence of the nature of the
conversion or evidence of the personal feelings of the debtor toward the creditor with the hope that
a strong inference of an evil mind may be created. Id. at 110.
119. Id.
120. Id. The court found that in a noncommercial setting, the standard is "whether a reasonable and prudent person would have known that the act complained of was unauthorized, or
whether the debtor actually knew it was unauthorized." Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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12 3
In addition, the court noted
phistication of the debtor was relevant.
that there might be some custom or usage which could cause the debtor
24
to believe that the act was not a conversion.1 One final factor the
court considered was whether the debtor had acted in subjective good
2
faith, "that is to say, with a full heart and empty head.'1 The court
found that the defendant, although aware of the security agreement,
"
did not know that he was prohibited from selling the cattle. Evidence
suggested, in fact, that it was customary in the industry for creditors to
27
The court
permit selling the herd without turning over the proceeds.
8 Although the defendant
thus held that the debt was dischargeable.'
had been aware of the rights of the plaintiff when the defendant sold
9
the cattle, he did so with the good faith belief that it was' permitted.'
This third approach examines the debtor from a subjective point of
view. The courts examine the defendant's state of mind and attempt to
3 °
determine whether the defendant acts with any level of culpability or
3'
is acting in "good faith."'
These three approaches to the willful and malicious exception have
" 2 This
created confusion in the actual standard that should be applied.
divergence has caused a wide disparity in the outcome of several cases
with similar facts. " As a result, a clear, consistent standard needs to
be adopted to provide uniformity in the current bankruptcy code.

III.

ANALYSIS

A uniform standard for the willful and malicious exception to discharge needs to be established. 4 A uniform standard would provide
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 111.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 112, n.11.
128. Id. at 112.
129. Id.
130. Long, 774 F.2d at 882.
.131. Burdick, 65 Bankr. at I 11.
132. See Comment, Exceptions to Discharge: Section 523, 3 BANKR. DEV. J. 295, 305-06
(1986).
133. For example, in In re Cecchini, 37 Bankr. 671, 675-76 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984), rev'd,
780 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986), the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit applied the
"intent to injure" standard and found the debt to be discharged. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals applied the "implied malice" standard and found that the debt was the result of
a willful and malicious act and reversed the lower court. Id. at 1443.
134. Perkins v. Scharffe, 817 F.2d 392, 395 (6th Cir. 1987) (Engel, J., concurring). "Uniformity on this question is desireable because bankruptcy is an area in which 'it is more important
that the applicable law be settled than that it be settled right.'" Id. (quoting Burnet v. Coronado
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). One author has suggested
that what is needed is a further clarification by Congress of their intent in promulgating section
523(a)(6). Comment, supra note 132, at 306.
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stability and predictability in a bankruptcy law of national scope.13 5
Such a standard, however, needs to reflect the overall purposes to be
achieved by discharge in bankruptcy.'8
As previously noted, these three divergent approaches have caused
substantially different results among cases with similar facts. One reason for this divergence may be the result of what one commentator has
labled an "outcome determinative" trend in the courts."3 " Such an approach "favors the party whom the court perceives as more deserving
of relief."'' 8 Courts using this approach employ a standard of malice
that favors the outcome they seek based upon what they consider to be
a fair or equitable result. 18 Such an approach obviously creates confusion as to what the proper standard for malice is. What is needed is a
standard approach for determining malice which takes into account
these equitable considerations while at the same time providing a measure of uniformity.
The standard for determining whether a debt comes within the
willful and malicious exception for discharge should achieve three
objectives. First, it should be uniform in application and result.14 0 Second, it should give effect to the intent of Congress."' Third, it should
establish clear and objective criteria with which to determine whether a
debt comes within the willful and malicious exception." 2
A.

"Intent to Harm" Standard

In examining the cases which have determined that an "intent to
harm" standard is required in order to except a debt from discharge, a
number of factors are present which militate against its use as a standard for the willful and malicious exception. Instead of providing rational, equitable results, this approach has resulted in a number of unsound decisions." 8

135. J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 16, at 18. The author stated that "bankruptcy law in this
country has a federal character and a degree of uniformity which distinguishes it from most of the
other subjects in the field of commercial law." Id.; see also In re Mclaughlin, 109 Bankr. 14, 1617 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989) (suggesting that guidance for future cases is an important consideration
when determining which standard to use for the willful and malicious exception to discharge).
136. See Howard, supra note 2, at 1050.
137. Comment, The Exception to Discharge For Willful and Malicious Injury: The Proper
Standard For Malice, 7 Bankr. Devs. J. 245, 255 (1990).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 256-57.
140. Perkins, 817 F.2d at 395.
141. See supra text accompanying note 63.
142. United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson, 35 Bankr. 766, 776 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1986) (suggesting that a flexible standard is needed to take all relevant factors into consideration).
143. See In re Hartley, 869 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1989) (debtor's act of throwing a lighted

firecracker into confined area where gasoline fumes were known to be present, with the express
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To determine whether the intent to harm standard is the approach
which should be adopted, it is necessary to examine the results obtained
in a number of different actions. For example, in In re Hartley,"" the
defendant sought to discharge a $1,000,000 judgment incurred as the
1 5
result of personal injury to the plaintiff. " The plaintiff, an employee of
1" 6 was cleaning tires with a gasoline mixture in an enthe defendant,
closed basement.14 7 The defendant, as a joke, threw a lighted firecracker into the fume-filled basement, allegedly intending only to startle the plaintiff. 4 8 The firecracker created an explosion, severely
injuring the plaintiff.14 ' The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying
15 0 The
the intent to injure standard, found the debt dischargeable.
court found that there was "simply no proof that Hartley threw the
firecracker into the basement intending to cause the explosion and fire
that injured Jones."1 51 Although the defendant threw the firecracker
into the basement intending to "startle" the plaintiff, the fact that
152 The defendant was
more extreme damage occurred did not matter.
15 The fact that
well aware that fumes had collected in the basement.
he did not intend to cause the harm which actually occurred kept the
act, from which the debt resulted, from becoming one which was willful and malicious. 1"
More commonly, disputes arise as to the standard to be applied in
1 55 Such cases generally involve
cases involving conversion of property.
debtors who sell or dispose of a piece of collateral in which the creditor
has a security interest.1 56 The question then becomes whether the debt

intent of scaring employee, did not come within willful and malicious exception); First Nat'l Bank
of Atlanta v. Mclaughlin, 14 Bankr. 773 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (debtor's act of selling secured
collateral without creditors' consent as expressly required in security agreement not malicious
within section 523(a)(6)).
144. 869 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1989).
145. Id. at 395.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. The dissent pointed out that the defendant was fully aware of the potential danger.
The first employee that had been sent to the basement to clean the tires refused to finish the job
because of the strong fumes. It is also evident that the plaintiff had been in the basement upwards
of 1-2 hours. Id. at 396. (Bowman, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Vaughn, 779 F.2d 1003 (4th Cir. 1985) (conversion
of contractor funds); In re Tester, 62 Bankr. 486 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986) (conversion of proceeds
from sale of motor vehicle); In re Gatte, 31 Bankr. 46 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1983) (conversion of
tractor and trailer).
156. See, e.g., In re Hodges, 4 Bankr. 513 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980) (debtor sold stereo in
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol16/iss1/7
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has been incurred maliciously. Generally, the answer is 'no' when the
intent to harm standard is applied because most debtors sell collateral
due to personal financial crises not intending to harm the creditor. 157
For example, in In re Cecchini,15s the defendants knowingly detained checks which were to go to the plaintiff in the erroneous belief
that the plaintiff was not reimbursing them for their commissions. 159
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit applied an intent to harm standard and found the debts dischargeable. 160 The court
held that, because the defendants believed the plaintiff owed them
money, they did not intend to injure the plaintiff, although they were
fully aware that they were at least contractually required to pay the
money to the plaintiff.1 61
The results in this case and others employing the intent to harm
standard indicate that such an approach, while arguably uniform in
application and effect, creates inequitable consequences for innocent
creditors who are injured by intentional acts of debtors.1 62 Any judgment may be discharged if the harm which occurred was not that
which the defendant specifically intended. 63 Moreover, in secured interest transactions, requiring an "intent to injure" effectively shackles a
creditor from ever establishing a willful and malicious injury." Normally, the most common reason for selling a piece of collateral and
breaching a security agreement is the need to escape dire financial
straits and not the desire to harm the creditor. 165 The intent to harm
standard has been described as placing a "nearly insurmountable burden" on the creditor who must show some amount of ill will or intent to
injure in order to get the debt excepted from discharge. 166
The intent to harm standard also purports to effectuate Congress'
intent as evidenced by the legislative history in section 523(a)(6). 1 11
Courts interpret the legislative history as completely overruling Tinker
v. Colwell 6 and disallowing any use of recklessness to establish an
exception to discharge. 19 These courts find that the word willful,
which creditor held security interest).
157. United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson, 35 Bankr. 765, 776 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
158. 37 Bankr. 671 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984), reved, 780 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986).
159. Id. at 671-72.
160. Id. at 672.
161. Id.
162. See. e.g., Hartley, 869 F.2d at 394.
163. See, e.g., In re Hodges, 4 Bankr. 513, 515 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980).
164. Cecchini, 37 Bankr. at 671.
165. United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson, 35 Bankr. 765, 776 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
166. In re Burdick, 65 Bankr. 105, 109 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 63 & 64.
168. 193 U.S. 473 (1904).
169. See In re Compos, 768 F.2d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 1985).
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meaning deliberate and intentional, modifies the word injury and therefore the legislature intended that section 523(a)(6) "not except from
discharge intentional acts which cause injury; [the section] requires in17 0
stead an intentional or deliberate injury."' This reasoning is71not justified upon examining the language of the legislative history.'
17
The legislative history only addresses the term willful. a The legislature prefaces its remarks with the definition of willful; "[ulnder this
paragraph, 'willful' means deliberate or intentional."17 The statement
continues, "[t]o the extent that Tinker v. Colwell held that a looser
standard is intended and, to the extent that other cases have relied on
74
Tinker to apply a 'reckless disregard' standard, they are overruled."'
A careful reading of this history should produce but one conclusion.
Because Congress spoke only of the term willful, it intended merely to
overrule Tinker's definition of willfulness and left the standard of implied malice alone.' 7 5 Further, by construing the exception to require a
"willful injury," the courts reduce the element of malice to unneeded
surplusage. Every willful injury will most likely come within the definition of malicious.' 7 6 If this were a correct interpretation, there would
be no need for Congress to retain malice as a separate element. The
requirement of both a willful (intentional) injury and a malicious injury seems to create an unneeded redundancy. According to one accepted canon of statutory interpretation, a statute should be interpreted
77
to give meaning to all words contained in the statute. As such, the
intent to harm standard cannot be a correct interpretation.
It is evident upon close examination that the intent to harm standard for interpreting the willful and malicious exception to discharge is
not a practicable approach. Although the standard may provide for
uniformity, it does so at the cost of making the exception for willful

Id.
See supra text accompanying note 64.
Id.
173. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 365, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6320-21.
174. Id. (citation omitted).
175. United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson, 35 Bankr. 766, 774 (Bankr. N.D. II1. 1983).
176. Malice has been defined as "[t]he intentional doing of a wrongful act without just
cause or excuse, with an intent to inflict an injury or under circumstances that the law will imply
an evil intent." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 862 (5th ed. 1989). Malice, therefore is implicit in the
term willful (deliberate or intentional) injury.
177. 2A N. SINGER, STATUTES & STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (1984) ("'Itis an
elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and
sentence of a statute.' A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so
that none will be inoperative or superfluous." (footnote omitted) (quoting State v. Bartley, 39
Neb. 353, 356, 58 N.W. 172, 174 (1894)).
170.
171.
172.
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and malicious injury ineffective.17 8 Because the creditor is charged with
the almost insurmountable burden of proving specific intent to harm,
he is effectively precluded from ever preventing a discharge of debt. 179
Such a standard creates unfair and absurd results where a debtor acts
with knowledge of the probable results although he may not have specifically intended the actual results.18 0 Finally, although the courts employing this standard purport to be effectuating Congress' intent, a
closer reading of the legislative history indicates that Congress sought
only to overrule the Tinker standard of recklessness as it applied to the
willful element. 81 It is evident that the legislature intended to retain
82
the implied malice standard.
B.

Heightened Culpability

The courts applying a level of culpability greater than the implied
malice standard but less than the intent to harm standard have tried to
provide a more equitable standard when interpreting the willful and
malicious exception to discharge. These courts have tried to distinguish
between worthy debtors and those less worthy because of some level of
bad faith, ill will, or other culpable conduct. 8 8 These courts have subjectively examined the debtor's state of mind, looking at the debtor's
immediate situation with respect to the debt.'"
These courts seem to have failed in their attempted distinction.
Their effort to establish a new standard appears to be nothing more
than an elaboration of the implied malice standard. As previously indicated, the Tinker Court held that the willful and malicious exception
only required legal malice as distinguished from special malice. 8 5 Special malice or actual malice may be defined as a design or intent to do
harm to a person or the interests of another. 86 Legal malice, on the

178. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rebhan. 842 F.2d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 1988).
179. Id.
180. Hartley, 869 F.2d at 395.
181. See United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson, 35 Bankr. 766, 774 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983).
182. Id. at 775; see supra text accompanying note 63.
183. See In re Mclaughlin, 109 Bankr. 14, 17 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989) (even though debtor
was aware of security agreement and was a sophisticated businessman, the fact that he tried to
use converted funds to aid his business kept his actions from being malicious); In re Burdick, 65
Bankr. 105, 111 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986) (the court should be concerned with the subjective good
faith of the debtor); see also In re Long, 774 F.2d 875 (8th Cir. 1985).
184. See Mclaughlin, 109 Bankr. at 14 (debtor's circumstances are considered and debt is
discharged if debtor has substantial belief that he could pay the debt in the foreseeable future); In
re Robinson, 86 Bankr. 182, 185 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988) (court determines whether debtor knew
or should have known that harm would have occured); Burdick, 65 Bankr. at I11 (court is to
inquire as to the debtor's good faith and make its determination based on the debtor's demeanor
and credibility).
185. Tinker, 193 U.S. at 490.
186. Id. at 487.
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other hand, refers to knowledge or substantial certainty that the action
1 7
The actor's motives
taken will result in harm or injury to another.
face of such knowlthe
in
action
irrelevant;
are
for performing the act
188 Because it is apparent that Congress
edge is defined as legal malice.
did not completely overrule the Tinker standard when it passed the Act
of 1978, the Tinker requirement of implied malice is still the controlling standard. Moreover, it is clear that the Supreme Court in Davis v.
Aetna Acceptance Co.1" required the determination of malice to be
1 0 The Davis Court also
made from the surrounding circumstances.
held that innocent conversions or other actions consistent with a course
of dealing do not come within the exception.'
The bankruptcy court of the Northern District of Indiana in In re
expressly rejected the intent to harm and implied malice
Burdick
standards and purported to create a new standard it termed the "totality of circumstances" standard.1 98 The court considered such a standard inherently more equitable because the standard takes into account
all surrounding circumstances as well as the debtor's subjective state of
mind. Factors the court would consider included the subjective good
and documents
faith of the debtor, the debtor's experience in business,
84
licenses.
or
leases
and
agreements
security
as
such
It is evident that the standard used by the court in Burdick is
contained within the implied malice standard. As indicated by the
Court in Davis, when determining whether a debt falls within the willful and malicious exception to discharge, the implied malice standard
18 8
requires a court to consider all surrounding facts and circumstances.
It thus appears that the Burdick "totality of the circumstances" standard is really nothing more than an element of the implied malice
standard.
One court which has attempted to set out a standard under this

187. Id.
188. Id. at 485-86.
189. 293 U.S. 328 (1934).
190. Id. at 332 ("But a willful and malicious injury does not follow as of course from every
act of conversion, without reference to the circumstances").
191. Id.
192. 65 Bankr. 105 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986).
193. Id. at 110.
194. Id. at 111. The court stated that:
by considering the factors of whether the debtor knew or should have known that his use of
property was unauthorized and whether the debtor engaged in the act . . . with a reason
other than to harm the creditor, the court feels that it is in a better position to discover
what was most likely the intent of the debtor at the time of the conversion than under the
two existing views.

Id.
195.

Davis. 293 U.S. at 332.
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"heightened culpability" approach is the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Long.'" The defendant in this case was the president of
A & C Johnson Company (A & C).' 9 1 A & C borrowed a substantial
amount of money from the plaintiff corporation.' 98 Pursuant to the
agreement, these loans were to be secured by A & C's accounts receivable and any proceeds from these accounts were to be deposited in a
collateral account.' 9 The defendant, in violation of this agreement, diverted some of these proceeds to a new corporate account. °0 In examining the defendant's conduct, the court set out a standard by which to
determine whether a debtor's conduct was willful and malicious.2 0 ' The
court created a two part test with which to determine the issue of dischargeability 202 The court found that the issue turned on the establishment of two elements: first, whether the conduct was "headstrong and
knowing; 208° and second, whether the conduct was "targeted at the
creditor ... in the sense that the conduct is certain or almost certain to

cause financial harm."' 20 ' The court found that, although the defendant's conduct was clearly willful, it was not malicious because he used
the diverted money in an attempt to save the business and prevent
losses to his creditors.20 5 The first element in the Long court's standard,
"headstrong and knowing, "206 corresponds with the willful prong of the
willful and malicious exception.20 7 The standard for willfulness, at least
in the context of section 523(a)(6), has not been in dispute. The congressionally mandated definition is that willful means intentional or deliberate.20 8 Thus, there is no apparent reason why the Long court felt
compelled to redefine that prong of the exception. The terms "headstrong and knowing" cannot mean anything other than intentional and
deliberate. If the court in Long meant something else, such a definition
contradicts the intent of Congress which expressly requires willful to

196.
197.
198.
199.

774 F.2d 875 (8th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 876.
Id. The plaintiff in Long was Barclays American/Business Credit, Inc. Id.
Id.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 881.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

205. Id. at 881-82. The court indicated that there was evidence that Long used some of the
diverted funds for his own personal benefit. Id. at 882. However, the court dismissed this use as de
minimus in light of the size of the entire claim. Id.
206. Id. at 881.
207.. Id.
208. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 365 (1977), reprinted in, 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6320-21; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5865.
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mean intentional or deliberate. °9 Moreover, the second element requiring that the action be targeted at the creditor" 0 is really nothing more
The court states that the action
than an implied malice standard."
should be targeted at the creditor, "at least in the sense that the conduct is certain to cause financial harm." ' In other words, the court
was essentially defining the same standard as the Tinker formula, that
13 This approach
is, conduct which would necessarily result in harm.
purports to apply a higher standard than is found in the implied malice
standard. 1 In effect, it is simply a further elaboration of the Tinker
implied malice standard coupled with the Davis requirement of examining all circumstances with respect to the debt.
In addition, this approach does not consider the intent of Congress
when establishing the standard. It ignores the legislative history which
accompanies the exception to discharge.2 1 5 The court in Long has created its own definition for the term willful, a term already defined by
Congress. 1 6
This approach which purports to follow a higher culpability standard cannot be sustained. It essentially restates the implied malice
standard as set out in Tinker and further deliniated in Davis. A stan211
dard requiring an examination of the "totality of the circumstances"
or "aggravated circumstances 2 1 8 provides no different criteria with
which to measure a debtor's conduct.21 9 In addition, these approaches
20
As a
ignore the legislative history that accompanies this exception.
debtors
all
which
upon
basis
a
establish
not
do
result, these approaches
may be evaluated.
C.

Implied Malice Standard

A majority of courts apply the "implied malice" standard when
22 1
This
construing the malicious prong of the exception to discharge.

209. See supra text accompanying note 64.
210. Long, 774 F.2d at 881.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 66, 523.16, at 523-117; see Long. 774 U.S.
at 881. To establish its malicious element, the court in Long did rely on the Tinker language
allowing malice where conduct "necessarily" causes harm.
214. Long, 774 F.2d at 881.
215. See id. at 875; Burdick, 65 Bankr. at 105.
216. Long, 774 F.2d at 881.
217. Burdick, 65 Bankr. at 110.
218. Long. 774 F.2d at 881.
219. See id.
220. Id.; In re Mclaughlin, 109 Bankr. 14 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989); Burdick, 65 Bankr. at
105.
221. See In re Ikner, 883 F.2d 986, 991 (1 1th Cir. 1989); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rebhan,
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standard provides that malice exists in any "wrongful act which neces'
sarily causes injury and is without just cause or excuse. 222
When the implied malice standard is correctly applied, it is the
proper standard for the willful and malicious exception. The implied
malice standard is the correct approach because it effectuates the goals
of the bankruptcy law and the intent of Congress while providing a
measure of uniformity among the jurisdictions.
This approach provides an objective analysis with which to determine the maliciousness of the debtor's action. Instead of having to determine the subjective intent of the debtor at the time of his act, this
standard allows a court to imply malice from the debtor's action when
the harm necessarily results from the action.
Courts can imply malice from the debtor's actions, his sophistication in business, his express
or implied knowledge of the probable consequences, and other relevant
facts surrounding the creation of the debt. 4 Such objective analysis
provides uniformity in cases with similiar facts while at the same time
ensuring that the honest or innocent debtor is provided a discharge.
The implied malice standard works regardless of the type of debt,
incurred or the type of action being sued upon. For example, in the
case of Wheeler v. Laudani
the question of a willful and malicious
injury was considered in the context of a libel action.2 2 The defendant
published a document accusing the plaintiff of exploiting his public office for personal benefit.2 2 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that the tort of defamation met the willful requirement of section
523(a)(6) 2 81 The court found that, when the debtor knows that the
published documents are false, such knowledge meets the willful prong
of the exception. 29 The court found that the intentional act of publishing false statements, with knowledge of the falsity of the statements,
comes within the meaning of malice under the exception.23 0 The court
held that mere reckless disregard as to the falsity of the statements is
not sufficient to establish the willful element. 3 If the defendant know-

842 F.2d 1257 (11th Cir. 1988); In re Laudini, 783 F.2d 610, 615 (6th Cir. 1986); Cecchini, 780
F.2d at 1443; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 779 F.2d 1003, 1009-10 (4th Cir.
1985); In re Ries, 22 Bankr. 343, 347 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982).
222. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 66, 523.16, at 523 118.
223. See In re Ikner, 883 F.2d 986, 991 (11th Cir. 1989).
224. United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson, 35 Bankr. 766, 776 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1983).
225. 783 F.2d 610 (6th Cir. 1986).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 611.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 615.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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ingly and intentionally published false statements about the plaintiff,
malice could be implied. 3
In the case of In re Tinkham 8 the debtor had been convicted
and fined for illegally dumping toxic chemical wastes in violation of
several local ordinances." ' A civil judgment was also entered against
the debtor in the amount of $11,357,000 for damages caused by the
waste.2 85 The facts demonstrated that the debtor was 30 years old at
the time of the dumping, that he had a ninth grade education and that
he had started out in the gravel business and had subsequently expanded into the waste hauling business.2 3 6 Using the implied malice
standard, the court found that the act of dumping the wastes was not
malicious within the meaning of § 523(a)(6). 87 The court based its
determination on the debtor's testimony and the surrounding circumstances. The court found that the debtor's actions indicated that he
knew something was not right about the dumping and that he knew the
liquid waste he was receiving did contain contaminants. 238 However,
the court believed the debtor's testimony that he was unaware of the
danger, noting that at the time of the dumping there was limited public
knowledge of the effects of toxic waste on the environment.2 9 Moreover, the court found that the debtor's act of calling in state officials to
inspect his tankers and the liquid waste corroborated his lack of knowledge of the potential danger from the waste.24 0 Thus, the court found
that, due to these surrounding circumstances, the debtor was not certhe dumping would occur,
tain, or substantially certain, that harm from
24 1
and as a result, the debt was discharged.
The implied malice approach has also been used to determine the
willful and malicious character of the action of a person intentionally
driving while intoxicated. In Moraes v. Adams, 42 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding that the defendant, Adams, had intentionally driven while drunk with knowledge that
probable harm would result. '4 8 The court found that malice could be

232. Id. The court, however, remanded the case for a determination of whether the jury
based its verdict on a reckless disregard standard or an actual knowledge standard. Id. at 615-16.
,233. 59 Bankr. 209 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986).
234. Id. at 210.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 212.
237. Id. at 217.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. 761 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1985).
243. Id. at 1425. The district court specifically relied on section 523(a)(9). a recent amendment to the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, passed after the cause of action arose. 11 U.S.C. §
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implied from the debtor's act because the harm, an auto accident, was
the type which necessarily results when one intentionally drives while
2 4
intoxicated.
The implied malice approach finds its most effective use in its application to cases involving breaches of security agreements or other
willful conversion actions. In utilizing the implied malice approach,
courts must consider all facts and circumstances to determine whether
legal malice is present. The majority of these courts have followed the
holding in the case of In re Ries.'" The defendant in Ries sold collateral in which the plaintiff held a security interest."" The bankruptcy
court for the Western District of Wisconsin found that, although the
defendant was not motivated by ill will or intent to harm the plaintiff,
it was sufficient that the defendant knew that harm would be caused
and proceeded in the face of this knowledge. 4 The court ruled that the
defendant's knowledge of the probable harm could be inferred "from
his experience in business, his concealment of the sale or his admission
that he read the security agreement which forbade the sale of the collateral. 2 ' 0 The court was not concerned with the subjective intent or
culpable state of mind of the defendant.24 9 Such a state of mind could
be inferred from the objective facts and circumstances. 5 °
Moreover, under this approach, a court cannot simply say that,
because a security interest existed and the defendant sold or eliminated
the property in the face of the secured interest, the debt was incurred
as the result of malicious conduct. The actual inquiry is whether the
debtor acted with knowledge or with substantial certainty that his action would harm the interests of the creditor.
The court in the case of In re Long 251 described how the implied
malice standard should be applied in the context of willful conversion
cases and breaches of security agreements. 52 Attempting to demonstrate a specific intent to harm in the context of conversion is nearly
impossible.2 58 The majority of debtors who sell assets in disregard of

523(a)(9) (1988). This amendment specifically excepts debts incurred as the result of drunken
driving. Id. The court relied on legislative history of the amendment which indicated that it was
passed to clarify the existing exceptions. Moreas, 761 F.2d at 1426.
244. Moreas, 761 F.2d at 1426.

245. 22 Bankr. 343 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982).
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 344.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 347.
774 F.2d 875 (8th Cir. 1989).

Id.
See In re Burdick, 65 Bankr. 105, 109 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986).
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security interests or who convert assets to their own use, do so, not
because of any desire to harm the interests of the other party, but
rather, because the debtor is in need of immediate financial relief. The
Long court, recognizing the difficulty of establishing actual malice,
stated: "[w]hile intentional harm may be very difficult to establish, the
likelihood of harm in an objective sense may be considered in evaluating intent. Use of objective information to ascertain intent to cause
harm is by no means unfamiliar.""' It is this knowledge of the likelihood of harm that the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Colwell 55 was
describing when it announced its implied malice standard as "conduct
which necessarily causes injury. "2 The court must examine the surrounding facts and circumstances to determine exactly what the debtor
knew at the time of the transaction.
The situation in Long involved a defendant who was a sophisticated businessman and well versed in the use of credit and secured
financing. 5 Long knew the diversion of funds from the collateral account was a breach of the contract and even admitted he knew that the
creditor would probably not have consented.2 ' 8 The court allowed discharge of the debt on the basis of Long's testimony that he was attemping to save the business. 2 59 The court indicated that it disapproved of
Long's conduct but could not find that the conduct rose to the level of
maliciousness. The court found that Long believed, in good faith, that
he could save the business and that his actions, based on the surrounding circumstances, were such that harm would not be substantially certain to occur.
The situation in which a debtor willfully breaches a security agreement tests the boundaries of the right to a fresh start.2 ' 0 As a result,
courts utilizing the implied malice approach in willful conversion cases
have been forced to examine each case very carefully. A court should
be able to base its findings on the objective facts surrounding the conversion. Relying on a debtor's unsupported statement that she was attempting to save or rejuvenate her dying business would defeat the goal
of establishing an objective, uniform standard. Ideally, a court should
inquire into and measure the subjective good faith of the debtor by
examining such objective factors as the debtor's use of the converted
funds, the likelihood that the business could be saved, the fact that the

254.

Long. 774 F.2d at 881.

255.

193 U.S. 473 (1904).

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Tinker, 193 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added).
Long. 774 F.2d at 881.
Id. at 881-82.
Id.
Id. at 882.
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debtor had read and understood the security agreement, and the
debtor's overall expertise in business. " ' The basic question the court
seeks to answer is whether harm was certain or substantially certain to
occur to the creditor's interests by the debtor's conversion of funds or
collateral. If, after examining such factors, the court finds that the
debtor must have been certain, or substantially certain, that harm
would occur to the creditor, then the court will imply malice and except
the debt from discharge. The standard for implied malice provides
clear and objective criteria to consider when determining whether a
debt While
falls within the willful and malicious exception. 6
this standard has been criticized as being too
pro-creditor,"6 such criticism is without merit. This standard still protects innocent debtors who mistakenly convert or dispose of encumbered property. For example, as stated by the Davis Court, "[t]here may be a
conversion which is innocent or technical, an unauthorized assumption
of dominion without willfulness or malice." 26 ' The debtor may convert
the collateral with the erroneous belief that such conversion is within
his rights or with the good faith belief, as evidenced by the surrounding
circumstances, that such conversion will not harm the creditor's interests. A defendant who innocently or mistakenly harms the plaintiff's
interests cannot be found to have acted maliciously. 65 As a result, not
every debt created by a wrongful, intentional act comes within the exception to discharge.
This approach also effectuates the intent of the Congress. As previously indicated, a careful reading of the legislative history indicates
that Congress merely intended to overrule Tinker's application of a
reckless standard to the term willful.2 66 The court in United Bank of
Southgate v. Nelson267 found that Congress intended to overrule
261. See, e.g., Ries, 22 Bankr. at 344 (implying malice from such factors as experience in
business, concealment'of the sale or the debtor's admission that he read the security agreement
which forbade the sale).
262. Id. at 347; See In re Tinkham, 59 Bankr. 209, 217 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986) (act of
dumping toxic wastes not malicious where facts indicated debtor was unaware of potential danger;
lack of knowlege inferred from such factors as level of public awareness concerning hazardous
waste and fact that debtor could request state inspection of the liquid waste).
263. In re Horldt, 86 Bankr. 823, 827 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). The court found that:
to allow a creditor to have a debt owed him found nondischargeable merely upon a showing
that the debtor acted intentionally, without just cause or excuse, and without further inquiring into the debtor's intent or knowledge of the wrongful nature of his conduct, at least
circumstantially, can cause severe harm to an innocent debtor.
Id. at 827-28.
264. 293 U.S. at 332.
265. Id.
266. United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson, 35 Bankr. 766, 774 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1983).
267. 35 Bankr. at 766.
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Tinker to the extent that it "has been interpreted to stand for a looser
standard of willful."" 8 The Nelson court found that Congress intended
the Tinker standard for implied malice to continue. 2 ' Because this interpretation is based on a very careful reading of the legislative history,
it effectuates the legislative intent.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Of the three approaches used in construing the willful and malicious exception to discharge, the majority approach, applying an implied malice standard, offers the best interpretation of the meaning of
willful and malicious. The implied malice standard provides clear and
definite criteria with which to determine whether a debt falls within the
willful and malicious exception. Moreover, the standard is consistent
with the underlying purpose of discharge in bankruptcy: that the debts
of an honest debtor, not a wrongdoer, be discharged. 7 0 Only in those
instances where the debtor was certain, or substantially certain, that
harm would occur (such certainty being implied from the surrounding
facts and circumstances), will the debt be excepted from discharge.
The purpose of equitable treatment of creditors is also advanced because the trier of fact is not required to delve into the subjective state
of mind of the debtor, thus, relieving the creditor of an insurmountable
burden of proof. The court instead can rely on the objective evidence of
the surrounding facts and circumstances.
Finally, it is clear that applying a standard of implied malice effectuates the intent of Congress as evidenced by the legislative history.
A close reading of that history indicates that Congress intended that
only the term willful means intentional and deliberate and cannot be
27 1
established by reckless conduct.
The intent to harm and heightened culpability standards do not
achieve the objectives of bankruptcy law as efficaciously as the implied
malice standard. In addition, it is clear that the first two approaches do
not effectuate Congress' intent. The implied malice approach accomplishes the objectives of bankruptcy law while providing uniformity in
application and result. The majority of courts follow this standard for
its clarity and objective fairness to both creditors and debtors.
Shawn M. Blatt

268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. at 774-75.
Id. at 775.
Id. at 776.
Id.
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